UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-9-2016

Wilson v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43200

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Wilson v. State Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43200" (2016). Not Reported. 2410.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/2410

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JARED JOSIAH WILSON,

)
)
NO. 43200
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
)
GEM COUNTY NO. CV 2014-622
v.
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Respondent.
)
___________________________)
________________________

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF GEM
________________________
HONORABLE MOLLY J HUSKEY
District Judge
________________________
SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #7353
P.O. Box 2816
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................... 2
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................................. 7
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... 8
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Wilson’s
Petition For Post-Conviction Relief ............................................................................ 8
A. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 8
B. Post-Conviction Jurisprudence ............................................................................. 8
C. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing The Claim Of
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Consolidating Two Cases
For Trial Based On His Failure To Investigate Mr. Wilson’s
Criminal History .................................................................................................. 12
D. The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing The Claim That
Defense Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Call Witnesses
And Put On Evidence ......................................................................................... 20
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 27
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ......................................................................................... 28

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) ................................................... 11
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758 (1988) ..................................................................... 9, 10
Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900 (2007) ............................................................. 9, 10
Coontz v. State, 129 Idaho 360 (Ct. App. 1996) ............................................................ 10
Crawford v. State, __ P.3d __, 2016 WL 1358103, *5 (Idaho Apr. 6, 2016) .................. 13
Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct. App. 1982) ......................................................... 20
Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532 (2013) ........................................................................... 23
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269 (Ct. App. 2002) ......................................................... 11
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) ..................................................................... 14
Idaho v. Jered Josiah Wilson, Dt. No. 39073, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 581, Idaho
Court of Appeals, July 12, 2013 ................................................................................... 2
Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813 (Ct. App. 1995) ......................................................... 10
McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567 (2010) .......................................................................... 18
Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274 (1998) ......................................................................... 21
Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401 (2006)........................................................................ 12
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918 (Ct. App. 1992) .............................................................. 9
Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454 (1991) ............................................................................. 9
Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581 (2000) ............................................................................. 11
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247 (2009)....................................................................... 11
State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 358 (Ct. App. 2003) ........................................................ 13
State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415 (1989) ....................................................................... 21
State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784 (Ct. App. 2007)............................................................... 12
ii

State v. Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903 (Ct. App. 2002) ........................................................... 18
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559 (2007) ............................................................................. 12
State v. McClure, 159 Idaho 758 (2016)........................................................................ 23
State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548 (2008) ............................................................................. 9
State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772 (1997) ............................................................................. 9
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355 (2010) .................................................................. 13
State v. Wilbanks, 95 Idaho 346 (1973) ........................................................................ 13
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437 (2008) ....................................................................... 11
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)...................................................... passim
Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643 (1968) ............................................................................ 10
Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44 (2009) ............................................................................ 11
Rules
I.C.R. 8(a)...................................................................................................................... 13
I.C.R. 13 .................................................................................................................. 12, 13
I.C.R. 14 ........................................................................................................................ 13
I.R.C.P. 56..................................................................................................................... 10
I.R.E. 404(b) .................................................................................................................. 18
Statutes
I.C. § 9-1406 ................................................................................................................. 23
I.C. § 19-4903 ................................................................................................................. 9
I.C. § 19-4906(c) ........................................................................................................... 10
I.C. §§ 19-4901 to 4911................................................................................................... 9

iii

Additional Authorities
Uniform Post- Conviction Procedure Act ......................................................................... 9

iv

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jered Josiah Wilson appeals from the district court’s Judgment summarily
dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On appeal, Mr. Wilson contends that
the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition in its entirety because, with
regard to four of Mr. Wilson’s claims, the evidence was sufficient to raise genuine issues
of material fact as to whether counsel was ineffective. The underlying criminal cases, in
which Mr. Wilson had been charged with two counts related to his sex offender
registration and two counts of lewd conduct, had been consolidated for trial.

One

incident of lewd conduct was alleged to have occurred in a car while Mr. Wilson was
driving from Twin Falls to Emmett, Idaho, and one incident of lewd conduct purportedly
occurred in Mr. Wilson’s house in Emmett.
The Petition was dismissed despite the fact that the district court found trial
counsel’s strategy to join the unrelated cases for trial was based on ignorance. Further,
Mr. Wilson submitted affidavits and evidence to demonstrate counsel’s ineffectiveness
in failing to call any witnesses or introduce any evidence which was available and which
would have cast further doubt on the victim’s credibility and/or shown the events as the
State’s witnesses described them were improbable.

Mr. Wilson submitted affidavits

showing one available witness would have testified that Mr. Wilson was not living at the
house in Emmett during the relevant time period and one witness would have testified
that he was usually in the car with Mr. Wilson when he drove to Twin Falls. Therefore,
the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on these four claims.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On June 27, 2011, Jered Wilson was convicted of two counts of lewd conduct,
one count of failure to register, and one count of failure to provide notice of change of
address to another state. (R., p.4.) On the lewd conduct charges, Mr. Wilson was
sentenced to life, with ten years fixed. (Trial Tr., p.481, Ls.16-19.)1 Mr. Wilson was
sentenced to a fixed term of ten years on the two registration offenses. (Trial Tr., p.482,
L.22 – p.483, L.13.) Mr. Wilson appealed from the judgment. (R., p.5.) On appeal, the
Idaho Court of Appeals vacated Mr. Wilson’s conviction for failure to provide notice of
change of address to another state. (Idaho v. Jered Josiah Wilson, Dt. No. 39073, 2013
Unpublished Opinion No. 581, Idaho Court of Appeals, July 12, 2013; R., p.5.)
On July 21, 2014, Mr. Wilson filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that
his trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) failing to move to change venue; (2) failing to
give an opening statement; (3) failing to seek to admit medical records, driving records
and employment records for use as rebuttal evidence; (4) failing to interview witnesses
who had exculpatory evidence and even one potential witness who said the victim
recanted her statements about lewd conduct; (5) failing to interview the victim prior to
trial; (6) failing to retain expert witnesses to testify as to petitioner’s driving status, and a
forensic psychologist to examine the reliability of the complaining witness’s identification
of the petitioner; (7) failing to protect petitioner’s speedy trial right; (8) failing to interview
victim’s older brother who was removed from the home for prior sexual abuse; (9) failing

The district court in Mr. Wilson’s post-conviction case took judicial notice of the trial
transcript. (Addendum to Record on Appeal (“Supp. R.”), pp.32-33.) For ease of
reference, Mr. Wilson shall refer to the transcript of the March 1-2, 2011 trial, as well as
the included pre- and post-trial hearings from the underlying criminal case, as “Trial Tr.”
1
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to seek funds for an investigator which would have resulted in defense counsel
presenting a copy of the petitioner’s medical report, employment record, utility bills as to
his residence, the victim’s brother’s stay at the Patriot Center and witnesses to testify as
to why he was there, and to interview defense witnesses; (10) failing to alert the district
court of threats of filing a persistent violator sentencing enhancement made by the
prosecutor

should

petitioner

testify;

(11)

failing

to

present

a

complete

defense/abandonment of petitioner’s only defense where petitioner asked for cases to
be tried separately but defense counsel said no, and also failed to mount any defense
or present any case; and (12) failing to notify petitioner of his re-sentencing or ensure
petitioner was present at his re-sentencing hearing in July of 2013.

(R., pp.3-71.)

Petitioner also alleged his due process rights were violated because he was denied his
right to testify at trial, the venue was incorrect, and he was denied his right to a speedy
trial. (R., pp.7, 10.) Petitioner also asserted that a conflict of interest existed between
him and his counsel which resulted in petitioner being tried without counsel.

(R., p.7.)

The State filed a motion for summary dismissal in which the State addressed
each of Mr. Wilson’s claims. (R., pp.72-162.) In its motion for summary dismissal, the
State asserted that, while “[t]he Petitioner offers affidavits of potential witnesses and
some medical reports and he alleges that these should have been used or investigated
further by his defense counsel,” Mr. Wilson did “not provide admissible evidence for
these or his other claims.” (R., pp.75-76.) The State conceded that the information he
presented “may raise some questions of fact” but reasoned that the questions of fact did
“not raise ‘genuine issues of material facts’ entitling him to an evidentiary hearing.”
(R., p.76.)

The State claimed that the affidavits and medical documents did not
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establish a solid alibi defense, or impossibility or actual innocence and further, that
Mr. Wilson did not show that if offered, the outcome in his case would have been
different. (R., p.76.) Mr. Wilson did not file any documents in response to the motion to
dismiss.
Thereafter, a hearing was held on the motion for summary dismissal. (3/23/15
Tr.) The district court dismissed Mr. Wilson’s post-conviction petition at the hearing,
and essentially adopted all of the arguments made by the State in its motion for
summary dismissal. (3/23/15 Tr.) The district court held, “[t]he Court is going to grant
the State’s motion for the reasons stated by the [ ] State.” (3/23/15 Tr., p.9, Ls.22-25.)
The district court further explained its reasoning regarding two of the claims—one claim
was the consolidation of the two trials:
Now, the only issue that I would have perhaps differed on is that initially
Mr. Mimura wished to consolidate these two trials, because there was -and I just had my little notes here. The first trial he didn’t want there to be
the opportunity to file a persistent violator on the failure to register charge.
The failure to register was filed in 2009, and was the first -- was the first
one set for trial. Then the L and L got filed in July of 2010, and that was
also set for trial.
And Mr. Mimura was concerned that if they -- well, two reasons. He was
concerned about Mr. Wilson testifying at the failure to register trial,
because apparently he’d been both in a hospital in Boise and at various
locations in Oregon, which would have exposed him to additional charges
for failure to register. But they were also concerned that if the L and L trial
went first, that he could be exposed to a persistent violator enhancement
on the failure to register, because he would then have three prior felonies.
That really was a strategy based on ignorance, because in fact,
Mr. Wilson already had sufficient felonies that they could have filed a
persistent violator enhancement. And so the reason to consolidate the
two trials to avoid that persistent violator enhancement wasn’t actually a
legitimate trial strategy, because whether the trials were consolidated or
not, he could have been charged with that persistent violator.
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However, it doesn’t rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel,
because there then is a conversation with the prosecutor, who says look,
even though he’s eligible, and we could file persistent violator, so long as
the charges remain consolidated and we go to trial tomorrow, we won’t file
it. And at that point, then, Mr. Wilson, through his attorney, agreed to
continue with the consolidation. So there certainly isn’t any ineffective
assistance of counsel in that regard.
(3/23/15 Tr., p.10, L.2 – p.11, L.18.)
The district court also provided the reason for its decision on another claim—
whether the testimony and evidence regarding Mr. Wilson’s inability to drive established
an issue of material fact. (3/23/15 Tr., p.11, L.19 – p.12, L.12.) Post-conviction counsel
attempted to clarify that the evidence showed that Mr. Wilson originally injured his
Achilles in October of 2005 but didn’t have surgery until 2006. (3/23/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.1420, p.13, Ls.3-11.)
The district court summarized the medical records as, “on April 16th, 2006, he
was in a knee splint, used crutches, no weight bearing. And then January 22, 2007,
sprained ankle, crutches till comfortable to engage in normal activities.

Did I miss

something?” (3/23/15 Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.2.) The district court noted that “we don’t
have anything that indicates for all of 2006 and all of 2007 he was medically prohibited
from driving. And similarly, we don’t have any driving record that indicates he was
prohibited from driving all of 2006 and all of 2007.” (3/23/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-10.)
The court granted the motion for summary dismissal based on the State’s
pleadings. (3/23/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.18-21.)
In its written order granting summary dismissal, the district court made no
additional findings but incorporated the arguments the State made in its motion for
summary dismissal:

5

The State filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal. The state [sic] noted
generally that the Petition should be dismissed because the alleged
deficiencies of trial counsel were based on trial strategy, Petitioner failed
to support his claims with admissible evidence and had not established
prejudice – that the outcome of the trial would be different. In addition, the
State addressed each claim, providing both argument and authority for the
various reasons the individual claim should be dismissed. No responsive
pleading was filed.
(R., p.165.)
Thereafter, the district court entered a final judgment. (R., pp.168-169.)
Mr. Wilson filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court’s dismissal of the
petition. (R., pp.170-175.)

6

ISSUE
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Wilson’s Petition for PostConviction Relief?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Wilson’s Petition For PostConviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Mr. Wilson established that issues of material fact existed as to his assertions

that his trial counsel was ineffective for agreeing to join his two cases based on the
erroneous belief that this strategy would prohibit the State from adding a sentencing
enhancement.

Mr. Wilson also asserted that trial counsel failed to call several

witnesses whose testimony would have further eroded the credibility of the victim and
failed to introduce evidence that he could not drive for lengthy periods of time which
would have made the possibility that the events occurred as the victim described even
less likely. In support of his claims, Mr. Wilson submitted evidence and several sworn
affidavits. Although the district court found that the trial strategy of defense counsel in
joining the two unrelated cases was “based on ignorance,” it still summarily dismissed
all of Mr. Wilson’s claims. However, Mr. Wilson actually presented prima facie evidence
of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding these issues and demonstrated a
reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s errors, the result of the trial would have
been different. As such, Mr. Wilson certainly should have been allotted an evidentiary
hearing on the four claims, and the district court erred when it summarily dismissed the
post-conviction petition in its entirety.
B.

Post-Conviction Jurisprudence
A Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is separate and distinct from the underlying

criminal action which led to the petitioner’s conviction. Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,
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456 (1991). It is a civil proceeding governed by the Uniform Post- Conviction Procedure
Act (hereinafter, UPCPA) (I.C. §§ 19-4901 to 4911), and the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. Peltier, 119 Idaho at 456. Because it is a civil proceeding, the petitioner
must prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Charboneau v. State,
144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). However, the petition initiating post-conviction proceeding
differs from the complaint initiating a civil action. A post-conviction petition is required to
include more than “a short and plain statement of the claim;” it “must be verified with
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records
or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or the application must
state why such supporting evidence is not attached.” Id.; I.C. § 19-4903.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through
post-conviction proceedings. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 924-25 (Ct. App. 1992).
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first show
that trial counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient—that the attorney’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).
The appellate court presumes that trial counsel was competent “and that trial tactics
were based on sound legal strategy.” State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 792 (1997). Trial
counsel's tactical decisions cannot justify relief “unless the decision is shown to have
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other
shortcomings capable of objective review.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561 (2008).
After a defendant shows that his counsel was deficient, prejudice is shown if there is a
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
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proceedings would have been different.”

Strickland, at 694; Aragon, at 760.

“A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

“The benchmark for judging any claim of

ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.” Id. at 686.
Just as I.R.C.P. 56 provides for summary judgment in other civil proceedings, the
UPCPA allows for summary disposition of petitions where there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
I.C. § 19-4906(c). In analyzing a post-conviction petition under this standard, the district
court need not “accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported
by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.” Martinez v. State, 126
Idaho 813, 816-17 (Ct. App. 1995). Additionally, the district court need not accept those
of the petitioner’s allegations which are “clearly disproved by the record.” Coontz v.
State, 129 Idaho 360, 368 (Ct. App. 1996). However, if the petitioner presents some
shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must take the
petitioner’s allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted by the
State. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968). This is so even if the allegations
appear incredible on their face.

Id.

The district court is required to accept the

petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but is not required to accept the petitioner’s
conclusion. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903.
“A petition for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal if the
petition has not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element
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of the claim upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof.” Pratt v. State, 134
Idaho 581, 583 (2000). Thus, a petition for post-conviction relief based on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel will “survive a motion for summary dismissal if the
petitioner establishes:

(1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether counsel’s

performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether the
deficiency prejudiced petitioner’s case.” Id. A district court may summarily dismiss a
post-conviction petition only where the petition and evidence supporting the petition fail
to raise a genuine issue of material fact that, if resolved in the petitioner’s favor, would
entitle him or her to the relief requested. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008).
If a genuine issue of material fact is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be
conducted to resolve the factual issues.
(Ct. App. 2002).

Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 272

The United States Supreme Court has defined the standard for

whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact as whether “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The inquiry performed is the threshold
inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a trial – whether, in other words,
there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved in favor of either
party” Id. at 250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must
be conducted.

Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444.

The underlying facts alleged by the

petitioner “must be regarded as true” for purposes of summary dismissal. Rhoades v.
State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009). Any disputed facts are construed in favor of the nonmoving party, and “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are
drawn in favor of the non-moving party.” Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009).
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Because evaluation of a motion for summary disposition does not involve the
finding of contested facts by the district court, it necessarily involves only determinations
of law. Accordingly, an appellate court will review a district court’s summary dismissal
order de novo. Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401, 402-03 (2006).
C.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing The Claim Of Ineffective
Assistance Of Counsel For Consolidating Two Cases For Trial Based On His
Failure To Investigate Mr. Wilson’s Criminal History
Mr. Wilson asserts that he presented prima facie evidence of ineffective

assistance of counsel on four of his post-conviction claims.2 Mr. Wilson asserted, inter
alia, that his trial counsel was deficient because counsel failed to reasonably investigate
Mr. Wilson’s criminal history and that deficiency prejudiced him because it resulted in
his cases being joined for trial, despite the risk that the jury would convict him based on
propensity evidence, and where in fact the jury convicted him of all charged counts.
The legal standards for proper joinder of offenses are contained within the Idaho
Criminal Rules. State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565 (2007); State v. Cook, 144 Idaho
784, 790 (Ct. App. 2007). Idaho Criminal Rule 13 provides that the district court may

Several of the claims alleged by Mr. Wilson in his petition were interrelated such that
Mr. Wilson, on appeal, will address them in two parts, although the claims were
identified as four claims in his post-conviction petition. Petitioner alleged, inter alia, that
his trial counsel was ineffective (iii) for failing to produce his employment records,
medical records or driving records (R., pp.12-14); (iv) failing to interview available
witnesses (Jered Lyle Wilson, Barbara Wilson, Jesse Wilson, and Rachel Wilson) who
had exculpatory evidence that would have rebutted the testimony of the State’s
witnesses, Kelly Petty and J.K.W (R., pp.15-19); (ix) failing to make reasonable
investigation (R., pp.28-30) which would have resulted in the presentation of medical
records, employment records, interviews of defense witnesses and information that
Mr. Wilson shared his residence with his sister; (xi) failure to present a defense
(R., pp.32-37) in that trial counsel did not try to separate the trials as Mr. Wilson
requested and did not call any of Mr. Wilson’s witnesses or present evidence or
documentation supporting his defense.
2

12

order two or more informations to be tried together if the offenses could have been
joined in a single information. I.C.R. 13. Two or more offenses may be charged in the
same information if the offenses, “are based on the same act or transaction or on two
(2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common
scheme or plan.” I.C.R. 8(a). Under this standard, the charges must have a sufficient
nexus between them in order to be properly joined. State v. Anderson, 138 Idaho 359,
361-62 (Ct. App. 2003). Idaho Criminal Rule 14 provides that, “[i]f it appears that a
defendant or the state is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses . . . the court may order the
state to elect between counts, grant separate trials of counts, . . . or provide whatever
other relief justice requires.” I.C.R. 14. Improper joinder of charges can prejudice a
defendant because the jury may be induced to regard proof of one offense as
corroborative of the other when, in fact, no such corroboration exists. State v. Wilbanks,
95 Idaho 346, 352 (1973).
Tactical and strategic decisions by trial counsel will not be second-guessed and
“cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have
resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective review.” State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 382–
83, 247 P.3d 582, 609–10 (2010). In the absence of a showing that counsel was
unprepared, ignorant of the relevant law, or exhibited any other shortcoming capable of
objective evaluation, the reviewing court will presume that the decision was one driven
by tactical or strategic decision making.

Crawford v. State, __ P.3d __, 2016 WL

1358103, *5 (Idaho Apr. 6, 2016).
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To demonstrate prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is defined as “a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. “The likelihood of a
different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86 (2011).
Here, the district court found evidence indicating that the decision to stipulate to
join the two cases was the product of inadequate preparation or ignorance of the law.
The district court found trial counsel’s decision to join the two cases “was a strategy
based on ignorance” and was therefore not a legitimate trial strategy. (3/23/15 Tr., p.10,
L.13 – p.11, L.7.) Although the district court found that defense counsel’s trial strategy
to agree to consolidation was initially based on ignorance, it found that, because the
State offered the day before trial to not file the persistent violator so long as the charges
remained consolidated and the cases went to trial the next day, that this was not
ineffective assistance of counsel. (3/23/15 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-18.) Thus, the district court
handling

Mr. Wilson’s

post-conviction

found

defense

counsel’s

strategy

was

unreasonable as it was based on ignorance, but found that it was not ineffective
assistance of counsel because the consolidation could later be rationalized post-hoc
due to a late agreement among the parties.
The day before trial, trial counsel made several statements explaining why he
agreed to consolidate the cases:
Judge, it’s my understanding that the State’s considered trying to add the
habitual offender on both of the cases which would expose my client to a
mandatory minimum of five years up to actual life on all of the counts.
Judge, obviously when we were making our determinations on having
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these matters consolidated, it was a situation where we didn’t believe that
my client was currently exposed to the habitual offender enhancement
which could have been filed.
Judge, last week the State discovered when they did a background check,
because it had never previously been done, that my client has actually
quite a few number of felony convictions here in the state of Idaho. I
believe that he has four felony convictions ranging from driving without
privileges to NSF check, forgery, and burglary.
Apparently, Judge, if we had known that, we may have come up with a
different position on whether or not to consolidate these matters.
Obviously when we were – of primary concern, trying to avoid a situation
where the State could enhance and file the habitual.
(Trial Tr., p.25, L.10 – p.26, L.5.)
Later, in discussions as to whether Mr. Wilson would take the stand and testify at
his trial, defense counsel again explained that he was mistaken and would not have
consolidated:
Judge, when I did make the strategic move at the time to have the cases
consolidated so that we could avoid consecutive trials because I was
under the misimpression that that was the only way that the State – or the
best way to prevent the State from being able to file the habitual status
offender enhancement, I made that based on inaccurate information,
Judge, because I wasn’t aware of my client’s criminal history. That wasn’t
provided to me by my client or by the State until the week before trial.
Obviously, in perfect 20/20 hindsight, that probably wasn’t the decision to
make in this case, because that does affect my client’s ability and rights to
testify separately and still maintaining his amount of credibility here.
(Trial Tr., p.379, L.18 – p.380, L.7.)
This strategy was unreasonable and based on ignorance of his client’s criminal
history.3 According to the May 25, 2010, Production of Discovery pleading, the State

Mr. Wilson had at least three prior felony convictions, of which the district court took
judicial notice. (Supp. R., pp.9-10.)

3
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had produced the prior criminal record of the defendant.

(R.39073, p.54.) 4

Even

supposing that the criminal history was not attached as the State represented, defense
counsel should have advised the State that its discovery responses were incomplete.
Instead, defense counsel proceeded to strategize based on a misapprehension, which
resulted in a stipulation to consolidate eight months later. (R.39073, p.341.) Defense
counsel had even been served with a Notice of Intent to Introduce Evidence of Prior
Convictions, but still did not realize that Mr. Wilson had more than one prior felony
conviction. (R., pp.328-329) (emphasis added). By the time defense counsel realized
his mistake one week before trial, it was too late to move to sever the two unrelated
cases. Such was a trial strategy based on ignorance.
Even the district court that tried the cases recognized prior to trial that the State
had not yet moved to amend to include the habitual offender, nor would the court likely
grant such a late motion.5 (Trial Tr., p.27, Ls.4-21.) Further, the trial court pointed out
that the only reason to proceed in this fashion would be trial strategy, as there wouldn’t
be any reason to admit evidence about the new charge on the failure to register case.
(Trial Tr., p.14, Ls.4-23.) Counsel was ineffective for agreeing to the joinder that would
only harm his client, and his last minute attempts to rationalize the decision and
subsequent new negotiation in order to justify continuing on to trial on the joined cases
was not reasonable trial strategy, but a strategy based on ignorance.
Additionally, it is not clear whether trial counsel even knew the penalties for the
registration offenses when he formulated this strategy. Counsel told the district court

Mr. Wilson moved the Court to take judicial notice of the record on appeal in Supreme
Court case, Dkt. No. 39073.

4
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that he chose not to have consecutive trials because of the exposure to the habitual
offender enhancement “because then all of a sudden we’d changed the registration
case from a maximum of five years to a minimum of five years up to natural life.” (Trial
Tr., p.26, Ls.18-23.) This was incorrect, and the prosecutor let the district court know
that the maximum sentence on the failure to register charge was actually ten years per
count. (Trial Tr., p.28, Ls.1-7.)
Not only was this error of counsel unreasonable, it had an adverse effect on the
defense.

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693.

Failure to make himself aware of

Mr. Wilson’s criminal history prior to altering trial strategy to join two unrelated cases—a
move that severely prejudices a defendant in nearly every instance—is a perfect
example of unreasonable performance demonstrating counsel’s unpreparedness. As
the district court found, the decision to consolidate based on ignorance was not a
reasonable trial strategy. (3/23/15 Tr., p.10, L.13 – p.11, L.7.) Furthermore, Mr. Wilson
was already facing a maximum penalty of life on the lewd conduct charge.
Mr. Wilson asserts that he suffered unfair prejudice from the charges being tried
together. Mr. Wilson could not testify at his trial on the lewd conduct charges without
opening himself up to questions on when and where he was living, whether he failed to
register. Mr. Wilson’s right to a fair trial was impacted due to the probability that the jury
concluded that because he had been convicted of lewd conduct in Missouri, he was
guilty of lewd conduct in Idaho. The jury likely found that he was guilty of the other
crime simply because of his criminal disposition—he is a bad person. See State v.

The district court judge who tried the case was not the same judge who heard the
post-conviction petition. (3/23/15 Tr.; Trial Tr., p.31, Ls.17-18.)

5
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Eguilior, 137 Idaho 903, 908 (Ct. App. 2002). This is precisely the evidence of prior bad
acts that is excluded under I.R.E. 404(b).
Defense counsel’s failure to ascertain his client’s criminal history and subsequent
blind march forward based on such a vital blunder can be likened to the facts of
McKay v. State. In McKay v. State, the Idaho Supreme Court held that McKay’s trial
attorney was objectively deficient for failing to object to jury instructions which omitted
the only disputed element in the case, and there was “no conceivable tactical
justification for trial counsel’s failure to object.” 148 Idaho 567, 572 (2010). The Court
vacated the summary dismissal of Mr. McKay’s application, finding that he had
established a genuine issue of material fact that trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance, thus, Mr. McKay was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Id.
Here, trial counsel made an enormous mistake of fact—something which could
easily be verified or disproved by a five minute check of the Idaho Supreme Court Data
Repository.6 Defense counsel’s strategy was fatally flawed and just plain wrong. No
amount of rationalizing can lead to a presumption of competence in such a situation.
Consolidating the lewd conduct case with a failure to register case, which proof of the
elements relied on the jury hearing evidence of a prior conviction for illicit sexual contact
could not fall within the ambient of reasonable representation.
The lewd conduct case suffered from a lack of evidence, in the case there was
no direct evidence, no eyewitness other than the victim. Further, this is a case where
the only evidence that the crimes occurred was statements from the alleged victim that
Mr. Wilson had inappropriate sexual contact with her, as there was no physical
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evidence or eye witnesses to the alleged conduct. During the trial, it was apparent that
J.K.W. was not a very reliable witness.7 (Trial Tr., p.327, Ls.2-21, p.328, Ls.6-8, p.328,
Ls.20-22, p.336, 3-18, p.342, L.12 – p.344, L.5, p.344, L.9 – p.345, L.17, p.348, Ls.1316, p.443, Ls.3-16.) Allowing the jury to hear testimony that there was a prior sexual
abuse conviction relating to a minor female in Missouri is tantamount to presenting
character evidence which is normally excluded due to well-founded fears that a jury may
find a defendant guilty based upon the idea that if he had done something before he is
more likely to do it again, acting in conformity with his character to engage in bad acts.
Mr. Wilson asserts that because of the credibility issues involved in this trial, a he said
she said case, that had the charges been separated, the verdicts may have been
different.
In light of all of this, it is readily apparent that there was a tremendous risk that
the jury would use information of Mr. Wilson’s prior bad act as the tiebreaker in
determining who to believe, reasoning that if Mr. Wilson had committed an act of lewd
conduct before, he probably did this time and, therefore, J.K.W. must be telling the truth.
As such, he asserts that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his
criminal history prior to agreeing to join the registration charges and the lewd conduct
charges for trial and his counsel’s deficient conduct “so undermined the proper

The multiple prior felony convictions occurred in Idaho. (Supreme Court Data
Repository, searched by name: JERED JOSIAH WILSON.)
7 In his closing argument, the prosecutor said, “I want to defend J[ ] for just a couple
minutes, or ask you to think about her testimony and come to your own conclusion
about her defense. J[ ] didn’t lie at all. She said that she didn’t know a lot of things, but
she never told a lie in here.” (Trial Tr., p.443, Ls.3-16.)
6
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functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.” Strickland, at 686.
D.

The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing The Claim That Defense
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Call Witnesses And Put On Evidence
Mr. Wilson asserts that he presented prima facie evidence of ineffective

assistance of counsel. He alleged in his petition and supporting affidavit that his trial
counsel was deficient where counsel failed to call witnesses that would have rebutted
the victim’s testimony, and further failed to offer evidence as to Mr. Wilson’s inability to
drive himself for vast periods of time. These deficiencies prejudiced him because the
jury failed to hear any testimony or evidence conflicting with or contradicting the victim’s
story which resulted in the jury convicting him of all charged counts.
In a post-conviction proceeding alleging ineffectiveness of trial counsel, the
Petitioner must establish facts through evidence that would be admissible at a hearing.
The application must be supported by written statements from potential witnesses who
are able to testify as to facts within their knowledge. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612,
617 (Ct. App. 1982) (holding that, “to justify an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction
relief proceeding, it is incumbent upon the applicant to tender a factual showing based
upon evidence that would be admissible at the hearing. It must be supported by written
statements from witnesses who are able to give testimony themselves as to facts within
their knowledge, or must based upon otherwise verifiable information.”).
A determination of whether failure to interview potential witnesses constitutes a
deficiency in representation is “judged according to the significance of the evidence the
witness has to offer and what other sources are available to ascertain the testimony of
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the witness.” Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 280 (1998) (quoting State v. Bingham,
116 Idaho 415, 424 (1989)).
Mr. Wilson asserted in his Petition that his trial counsel was ineffective because
the defense rested without calling any witnesses or putting on any evidence.

8

(R., pp.12-19.) In his Petition, Mr. Wilson identified the witnesses, provided what their
testimony would have been, stated that they were available to testify, and alleged that
he was prejudiced by their absence at trial where such testimony would have
impeached the testimony of several of the witnesses at trial, including J.K.W., and this
was demonstrated by the finding of guilt against the Petitioner.

(R., pp.15-19.)

Mr. Wilson supported his claim by attaching affidavits from the witnesses which
described what they would have testified to, their willingness and availability to testify,
and the fact that they were never contacted by defense counsel.

(R., pp.55-63.)

Mr. Wilson identified four witnesses that should have testified at trial: Jered L. Wilson,
Barbara Wilson, Jesse Wilson, and Rachel Wilson. (R., pp.15-18.)
Three witnesses provided an affidavit as to what their testimony would have
been, had Mr. Wilson’s defense counsel called them at trial.

(R., pp.55-63.)

For

example, Mr. Wilson’s father would have testified that Mr. Wilson was not driving during
the time period the abuse was alleged to have occurred and there was usually an adult
present in the car with Mr. Wilson and J.K.W. (R., pp.55-57.) Mr. Wilson’s mother

On December 17, 2010, one year before trial, the defense served, as part of a
discovery response, a pleading which advised that the defendant may take the stand,
and the defendant did not anticipate calling any other witnesses, however, the following
persons may be called as possible witnesses: Diane Wilson, Kayllyn and Everett Reed,
Jered L. Wilson and Barbara Wilson, Michele Wilson, Francis Michaels, Matt Michaels,
Rachel Wilson, Shelley Logston, Janet Lockhart, Christy and Mattie Dickinson
(R.39073, pp.106-108, 335-336.)

8
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would have testified that Mr. Wilson was not living at the house during the time period
the abuse was alleged to have occurred at the house. (R., p.59.) One witness even
wrote that J.K.W. had told her that Mr. Wilson “didn’t do anything and that she was
scared of her mother.” (R., p.63.) Further, three witness advised the district court that
they had tried to contact Mr. Wilson’s defense counsel to tell him what they would be
willing to testify to at his trial. (R., pp.55-64.)
In its motion for summary dismissal, the State claimed that the witnesses’
testimony was not significant. (R., p.83.) The State misrepresented the anticipated
testimony of Rachel Wilson by asserting that this potential witness was someone “to
whom the victim would have reported to if something had occurred.”

(R., p.84.)

However, that was not the substance of Ms. Wilson’s anticipated testimony.

The

document signed by Ms. Wilson contained information that Rachel Wilson actually had
spoken to the victim who had told her that the petitioner “didn’t do anything” and that
“[J.K.W.] was scared of her mother,” presumably meaning that Mr. Wilson was actually
innocent of the lewd conduct charges. (R., p.63.)
The State argued that it was the defense’s tactical decision not to call any
witnesses because putting on such evidence would not have been persuasive as the
defense would have had to show that there was no time during the 2006-07 visitations
that the petitioner was capable of committing these acts. (R., pp.85-86.) The district
court relied on the State’s analysis in granting the State’s motion for dismissal and
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found that the witnesses did not establish “a solid alibi defense, or impossibility or actual
innocence.”9 (R., p.76.)
However, the affidavits called into question the veracity of the testimony
presented at trial. For example, the State’s witness J.K.W. initially testified that it was
just she and Mr. Wilson in the car; however, the affidavit of Jered L. Wilson indicated he
would have testified that he or another family member was usually in the car as
Mr. Wilson had medical issues or license suspensions during this time; thus, his
testimony of would have impeached the credibility of J.K.W. (Trial Tr., p.342, Ls.12-17;
R., pp.55-56.) As another example, J.K.W. testified that there were incidents of lewd
conduct inside the house, yet the affidavit of Barbara Wilson made clear that Mr. Wilson
was not living at the house during the relevant time period. (Trial Tr., p.331, L.22 –
p.333, L.19; R., p.59.) This was a legitimate defense as to one of the lewd conduct
charges. Yet the jury only had the testimony of the State’s witnesses, unchallenged by
the defense. Due to defense counsel’s failure to put on a single witness, the jury was
only allowed to hear and consider testimony from the prosecution without ever hearing
other information which would have assisted the jurors in weighing the credibility of the
State’s witnesses. (R., p.15.)
While it was not clear if any of these witnesses provided a complete
alibi defense, in a case such as Mr. Wilson’s where the word of one person, the victim

While one witness provided a signed statement in which she claimed to have been
told by the alleged victim that the allegations were untrue, the document was not
notarized or otherwise in a permissible form pursuant to I.C. § 9-1406. See State v.
McClure, 159 Idaho 758, __, 367 P.3d 153, 155-56 (2016). As such, despite the fact
that this would be beneficial to the defense for impeachment purposes, pursuant to
Fields v. State, 155 Idaho 532, 537 (2013) (holding that declaration was inadmissible
9
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J.K.W., was the sole testimony and evidence the State had to prove its lewd conduct
charges, any additional flaws in her version of events could erode her credibility to the
jury. Such a determination would be key to a defense for these charges, particularly
where there was no physical evidence corroborating the victim’s statements. That is, as
discussed in Section C, the State’s case was relatively weak, in that the only direct
evidence against Mr. Wilson was the testimony of J.K.W., who testified multiple times
that she could not recall or remember important facts surrounding the alleged conduct,
and who was not sure whether she had lied the day she testified at trial.

(Trial

Tr., p.336, Ls.11-14, p.348, Ls.13-16.)10 J.K.W.’s mother testified that she had learned
of the alleged incidents through her son, Joshua; however, her memory was deficient as
well; she testified several times that she was “bad with dates.” (Trial Tr., p.274, Ls.6-8,
p.278, Ls.14-17, p.290, Ls.17-21.)

The district court should have thus held an

evidentiary hearing where the potential defense witnesses’ had knowledge that
undercut the State’s witnesses’ testimony. As such, the district court erred in summarily
dismissing the petition.
As to Mr. Wilson’s claim that trial counsel failed to obtain employment, medical,
and driving records (Claim No. 3), the State asserted that trial counsel cross-examined
the victim as to the timeframe of the lewd conduct charges, who drove the vehicle for
visitation, and whether the victim’s mother knew of Mr. Wilson’s injuries, thus negating

because it was not an affidavit nor were there “any other indicia of authenticity”), the
document is not considered “admissible” for consideration in post-conviction appeal.
10 When asked by the prosecutor, “[i]s there anything that you told us today that’s not
true?” she responded “[n]o, I don’t – no. I don’t remember – I don’t – I don’t know.”
(Trial Tr., p.336, Ls.11-14.) When asked by defense counsel whether she had lied that
day, she responded “I don’t think so.” (Trial Tr., p.348, Ls.13-16.)
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the claim that defense counsel did nothing with this information. (R., p.82.) The State
asserted that the medical, driving, and employment records were incomplete and
speculative and would not have successfully rebutted the State’s case or changed the
outcome. (R., pp.82-83.)
In support of his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce
evidence of his employment, driving, and medical records, Mr. Wilson submitted
evidence that his regular driver’s license as well as his commercial driver’s license were
suspended for considerable periods of time. (R., pp.65-67.) Further, Mr. Wilson had
physical problems with his ankle, and was even on crutches for a period of time.
(R., pp.69-73.)
At the hearing on the State’s motion for summary dismissal, the district court
provided its rationale regarding whether the testimony and evidence of Mr. Wilson’s
inability to drive established an issue of material fact. (3/23/15 Tr., p.11, L.19 – p.12,
L.12.)

Mr. Wilson’s post-conviction counsel attempted to clarify that the evidence

showed that Mr. Wilson originally injured his Achilles in October of 2005 but did not
have surgery until 2006. (3/23/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.14-20, p.13, Ls.3-11.)
Thereafter, the district court summarized the medical records as, “on April 16th,
2006, he was in a knee splint, used crutches, no weight bearing. And then January 22,
2007, sprained ankle, crutches till comfortable to engage in normal activities. Did I miss
something?” (3/23/15 Tr., p.12, L.23 – p.13, L.2.) The district court noted that “we don’t
have anything that indicates for all of 2006 and all of 2007 he was medically prohibited
from driving. And similarly, we don’t have any driving record that indicates he was
prohibited from driving all of 2006 and all of 2007.” (3/23/15 Tr., p.14, Ls.5-10.)
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However, Mr. Wilson did not have to establish that he was physically unable to
drive for the entire two-year time period, it would have been sufficient for his counsel to
impeach the witnesses using such information, in order to place further doubt in the
jurors’ minds.

This was already a jury that used a considerable period of time

deliberating on his guilt. (Trial Tr., p.467, Ls.4-6.) It took the jury nearly three hours to
reach a verdict. (R.39073, p.447.)
At the summary dismissal stage, Mr. Wilson needed to show there existed a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether his counsel’s deficient conduct “so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be
relied on as having produced a just result.”

Strickland, at 686.

He sufficiently

established that he was entitled to a hearing where he substantiated his allegations with
multiple affidavits. Mr. Wilson had to establish that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether his counsel was deficient and if so, whether there was a
reasonable probability that, but for the deficient conduct, the result of the trial would
have been different.

Thus, the district court’s dismissal of all of Mr. Wilson’s claims

was error.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Wilson respectfully requests that this Court vacate the summary dismissal of
his post-conviction petition with respect to the issues of whether trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to investigate/agreeing to join the two cases and for failing to call
witnesses and introduce evidence at trial, and remand the case to the district court for
an evidentiary hearing on these issues.
DATED this 9th day of May, 2016.

___________/s/______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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